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INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to review different 
industrial co-operation and investment policies within the 
regional and subregional economic integration schemes in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
The first part attempts to put some conceptual aspects of 
the economic integration process within the framework of the 
theory of the internationalization of production. The second part 
reviews the current situation of industrial co-operation and 
investment policies. Lastly, in the third part some suggestions 
for further research are made. 
The basic research was made during January 1987 for the 
Regional and Country Studies Branch of the Studies and Research 
Division of UNIDO, in Santiago, Buenos Aires and Vienna. The 
current version has been updated during July 1988. 
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I. SOME CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS 
1. The analytical context 
The subject of economic integration is normally included within 
the analytical framework of foreign trade. Of course this is 
correct as far as trade plans are considered, but regional 
industrial co-operation, investment policies, the promotion of 
multinational protective enterprises - not only trade-oriented 
ones - and other related topics do not really belong in the 
analytical context of foreign trade, but of the process of the 
internationalization of production (IP).-
The current - mistaken - consideration of the aspects of the 
internationalization of production within the conceptual 
framework of external trade has very significant theoretical and 
practical implications. Very often the very specificity of the 
phenomena is overlooked and its dynamics is not adequately 
grasped. This, of course, induces descriptions and policy options 
which are often irrelevant. On the other hand, the lack of an 
adequate analytical framework forbides the consideration of 
different ongoing processes: this is the case, for example, of 
foreign direct investment by private firms within the region and 
beyond. There is no theoretical or practical justification for 
the split of the same phenomenon - the internationalization of 
production - according to whether it takes the form of a purely 
private initiative or if it is made within some legal and 
publicly endorsed regime. 
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2. The process of internationalization of production 
a) Aaants and characteristics 
In simple terms, the internationalization of the productive 
process is the organization by an economic agent of production 
across national frontiers. There are three different impulses 
which further this process: * 
(i) Private foreign direct investment. Its main agents are the 
transnational corporations, especially those which have their 
strategic decision-making centres in the developed market 
economies countries, but also others where central management is 
located in developing countries. For some time now foreign direct 
investment by developing countries has been increasing and this 
process has evolved with little direct involvement from the 
Governments. This process has included firms from the NICs, but 
also from other, smaller countries. Part of this process is 
reflected in the very incomplete statistics on intra-Latin 
American investments gathered by INTAL. 2 (see Table 1). 
According to, again, incomplete figures there were almost 600 
cases of direct investment by private firms in other Latin 
American countries in 1982; more than 200 of them were joint 
ventures with local firms. 3 It is safe to conclude that there 
were more than that, although the subsequent economic crisis must 
have reduced their actual numbers. 4 Another important 
development in this field is the growing significance of the 
maquiladoras in Mexico; they are across the border assembly 
plants that use foreign parts and supplies and export or reexport 
the finished products to the US. The 1200 in-bond assembly plants 
generate Mexico s second largest flow of foreign exchange after 
oil; the number of employees has increased threefold since 1982, 
to 300,000. 5 
TABLE 1 
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LAIA NENBER COUNTRIES BY 31 DECEMBER, 1982, 
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (NILLION OF DOLLARS) 
Country of Receiving countries 
origin Argentina Bolivia Brazil Colombia Chile Ecuador Nexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Total Percentage 
Argentina • • • 2.9 33.0 1.4 21.2 13.2 1.3 16.2 5.0 10.0 6.6 110.8 16.9 
Bolivia 2.6 ... 0.1 0.3 7.7 1.7 0.1 12.5 1.9 
Braz i I 52.6 1.3 ••• 3.0 44.1 7.7 1.6 52.8 2.8 0.5 166.4 25.4 
Colombia 22.0 0.2 ... 12.6 21.8 12.1 1.5 1.8 72.0 10.9 
Chile 2.7 0.3 1.6 0.2 13.9 0.4 2.1 3.0 0.2 24.4 3.7 
Ecuador 0.2 20.8 ... 1.9 22.9 3.5 
Mexico 0.8 13.3 5.7 3.5 5.6 ... 3.9 3.0 35.8 5.5 
Paraguay 0.2 ... 0.1 0.3 0.0 
Perú 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 11.3 0.4 3.4 16.9 2.9 
Uruguay 13.9 35.2 1.6 12.2 0.1 5.8 0.9 5-1 ... 2.7 77.5 11.8 
Venezuela 11.0 16.8 49.6 5.9 23.7 3.1 1.6 5.2 116.9 17.8 
Costa Rica 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.6 2.0 0.3 
El Salvador 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.7 0.3 
Guatemala 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 
Nicaragua 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Total 106.3 5.1 100.7 83.2 100.6 97.6 34.3 73.6 30.2 10.0 19.1 660.7 
Percentage 16.1 0.8 15.2 12.6 15.2 14.8 5.2 11.1 4.6 1.5 2.9 100.0 
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(ii) Public economic integration schemes for productive 
purposes. The systems of complementation of production 
existing in the Eastern European Countries are important examples 
of this second case. But it also includes supranational 
productive arrangements by the public sector or by public 
enterprises of different countries, like those in Latin America.6 
(iii) Mixed forma of internationalized production. This third 
impulse to the IP process stems from the economic integration 
efforts aiming at some kind of international specialization of 
the productive system. 
The three kinds of IP have important differences among them. 
They arise mainly from the type of economic agent which is 
involved - public, private or a mixture of them - and from the 
characteristics of the economy where the matrix is situated. But 
all of them aim at international specialization in order to 
attain higher productivity levels, higher profits, or both. 
Regarding private firms participation in the IP process, the 
starting point of the analysis is the recognition, as a main 
condition for this process, of the different resource endowment 
of each enterprise, which includes a better knowledge of 
production, capacity for product differentiation, 
underutilization of entrepreneurial and managerial capacity, and 
other assets - generally intangible - susceptible of generating 
profits. 
This different endowment of some enterprises is associated 
with that of resources, with the economic cycles and with the 
features of the markets of the countries of origin. Frequently 
this is also associated with the size of the enterprise and its 
performance in oligopolistic markets. 
The second condition for this type of internationalization 
relates to advantages acquired by a firm thanks to production in 
another country, since if these advantages did not exist there 
would be a*preference for straight forward foreign trade or the 
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granting of a license, as other ways of entry into foreign 
markets. The imperfections of the markets are of crucial 
importance, since they give a powerful impetus to the enterprises 
able to internationalize their output, thereby avoiding the 
disadvantages or making use of the advantages of the 
imperfections existing in the mechanisms of resource allocation. 
These imperfections can be due to the type of market in 
question - barriers against entry, high cost of transactions, or 
difficulty in achieving economies of interdependent operation 
(all aspects which affect the resulting system of prices) - or to 
interventions by the public sector. In the latter case mention 
may be made of the differences between the economic policies of 
the different government - as regards taxation or the exchange 
rate, for example - or the systems of protection of ownership of 
technological knowledge. 
There are undoubtedly other factors which condition the 
internationalization of production, such as government policies 
as a whole, both in the countries of origin of the investment, 
and in the host countries. Some policies have a negative impact, 
such as exchange control, double taxation, difficulties for 
profit remittance, etc. However, governments have also been 
concerned with the promotion of multinational firms, usually 
joint ventures. 
Governments have different reasons to promote region-wide 
multinational firms. One of them is to reap economies of scale. 
According to this argument the complete structure of average and 
marginal costs, even if increasing in a static sense, falls as 
production proceeds. The downward displacement of the cost 
structure is caused by technological gains, increases in 
productivity, and improvements in human capital, which can be 
achieved only through learning by doing and cannot be separated 
from the production process. An additional element play6 an 
important role: the indivisibility of plant size. Individual 
country markets may be large enough to ensure efficient primary 
import substitution, but further import substitution involving 
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intermediate imports, consumer durables, and capital goods 
require a larger market if a dynamic comparative advantage is to 
be attained. The reason is that, in many sectors, minimum plant 
sizes are a pre-requisite for the start up of production at 
reasonable costs, and such production in turn requires larger 
outlets than the individual national markets. Therefore, in their 
efforts to enlarge the scale of import substitution, developing 
countries are constrained by limited national markets that do not 
allow the establishment of plants of a size conducive to 
subsequent improvements in productivity and competitive 
production costs. In this view, economic integration is a way of 
overcoming the limitations of the national market by allowing the 
establishment of economically efficient plants designed to 
produce for larger union markets. 
This dynamic approach to customs unions does not mean the 
rejection of the classical doctrine of comparative advantage but 
rather its application to a protectionist context. Since a 
vigorous export promotion policy is not discarded, members of the 
union are expected to specialize in industrial activities in 
which they have intra-union comparative advantage because of 
their different resource endowments. 
(b) The forms of internationalization 
The internationalization of production can take place in two 
ways: (a) through horizontal expansion of the enterprise to 
produce mainly the same goods in the country receiving the 
investment; and (b) through vertical integration - backwards or 
forward - which incorporates the plant of the host country into 
the global process of production. The prototype of horizontal 
integration corresponds to total local production, with local 
inputs, of a final good. The opposite pole is internationally 
integrated production, with inputs which are generally imported, 
of à product that in its turn complements the production on the 
international plane of a good marketted in different national 
markets, (see figure). 
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There are various intermediate types, such as the 
internationally integrated production of final goods in various 
countries and the local production, with local inputs, of goods 
which in turn complement the international production of a final 
good. There are also combinations of both types of integration, 
both for the products of a single transnational corporation -
some of which may correspond to horizontal integration and others 
to vertical intégration - and by branches of a single 
transnational corporation, in the case of conglomerates which 
include various lines and types of products. 
The modes of internationalization of production adopted will 
depend on various factors, such as: (a) the economic sector in 
which the^enterprise operates; (b) the type of resource which 
gives its superiority over local enterprises; (c) the government 
policies in the economic area which affect the allocation of 
resources and the international trade carried out; (d) the 
greater or lesser degree of specificity of its inputs; and (e) 
the peculiarities of the different economies in which such 
corporations work, both as regards the resource endowment and the 
characteristics of their markets. 
(c) The consequences for the host economies 
The growing internationalization of production has important 
effects, - both on the structure and dynamism of various aspects 
of the international economy, and on the countries - where the 
transnational productive units operate. Internationalization not 
only affects the directly productive processes at the national 
and international level - with all the imaginable consequences 
regarding resource allocation and international specialization -
but also the financial and capital flows, as well as 
international trade. 
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The implications for the host economies will vary according 
to the type of internationalization practiced by the 
transnational productive units. The different forms and 
combinations of organization, production and sales they use will 
have special effects on the host economy and particularly on its 
foreign trade. 
The fact that the imperfections of the market help to foster 
internationalization means that the transnational firms do not 
automatically tend to eliminate them, since they are often a 
source of profit. These enterprises tend to provoke imperfections 
in the allocation of resources, since they frequently operate in 
oligopolistic markets, whose characteristics they reproduce, and 
they have the capacity to overcome the market mechamisms and the 
restrictions imposed by public regulations. Again, the 
exploitation of the imperfections of the market by the 
transhationals means that the ensuing benefits will not 
necessarily remain in the receiver countries unless the latter 
apply policies to achieve this end. In the regional or 
subregional integration initiatives taken by governments it can 
be seen that very process designed to homogenize the national 
economic spaces gives preferential treatment to those enterprises 
which can undertake international specialization, operating from 
several countries simultaneously. It is another matter, of 
course, if the firms installed to supply the local market are 
interested in deepening the process of internationalization of 
their production. 
Certain types of specialization promoted by the 
transnationals tend to be detrimental to the host countries, 
along with various aspects of their production, external trade, 
marketing and technology transfer strategies. They have also been 
criticized in their countries of origin for their effects on the 
balance of payments, employment, levels of prices, productivity 
and income. 
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With regard to publicly defined IP schemes, there are also 
significant problems. On the one hand, it is necessary 
"to solve the location problem, one of the sources of 
inequity in the distribution of costs and benefits... 
The purpose of industrial planning is to avoid the 
market process and directly determine the location of 
new industries. The objective is to maximize the benefits, 
for the region as a whole, of the establishment of new 
industries and, at the same time, to distribute those 
benefits equitably. These two objectives may not be 
consistent since maximization of benefits presupposes the 
full exploitation of intra-regional comparative advantage, 
which may not satisfy regional equity considerations. In 
addition, industrial planning is largely biased in favour of 
producers and disregards the implied costs for consumers 
and the distribution of those costs. If the costs are 
unevenly distributed, pressures to stall such planning are 
certain to mount. 
The potential conflict between efficiency and 
distributive equity may threaten the viability of industrial 
planning. It may be argued that, since the purpose of 
industrial planning is to assure a more equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits from integration, the 
efficiency criterion should be eschewed in favour of higher 
intra-regional equality. Since such a policy could mean very 
high costs and a waste of resources, mechanisms that allow 
the separation of location from ownership may be more 
appropriate. The new industry could be owned by 
multinational corporations formed by all the member 
countries, the distribution of dividends being linked to the 
level of benefits and to some agreed criteria for 
distributing them equitably. 
Two additional difficulties related to regional 
industrial planning are the delegation of authority to a 
multinational entity and labour mobility. With the first, 
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the difficulty is similar to that with the common external 
tariff. If the long-term development approaches of the 
member countries do not coincide, the sectoral priorities of 
the national development strategies may clash with those of 
regional industrial planning. Since acceptance of the 
principles underlying the regional programmes implies the 
submission of national planning to more global 
considerations, it also implies the surrender, at least in 
part, of the power to determine the patterns and 
characteristics of industrial development. The long-term 
implications of those considerations make the surrender 
of power in this area politically impossible".7 
In a classical-type argument it might be pointed out that a 
contradiction arises between the development of the productive 
forces induced by the internationalization of production and the 
mechanisms of decision-making, appropriation and assignment of 
the surplus by their agents. The mere geographical expansion of 
this internationationalization increases and gives power to both 
local and international trade. The imbalances and transfers of 
resources which it produces are also of great importance. 
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II. INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AND INVESTMENT POLICIES 
WITHIN THE REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
1. Regional Industrial Programing 
Industrial growth is confronted in Latin America by serious 
problems, both on the demand (size and structure of the markets) 
and on the supply side (availability of resources, technology and 
inputs). One way out of these problems which Latin American 
countries have taken is the integration of the industrial 
productive sectors. The results have not been very successful so 
far. 
(a) Central American Common Market (CACMÏ 
The aim of Central american Common Market on this regard was 
to promote investments in the "integration industries", 
designated as such because they needed the expanded Central 
American Market to reach economies of scale in order to operate 
under competitive conditions. These industries would benefit from 
the unrestricted opening of member country markets and from the 
protection against external competition provided by a common 
external tariff. 8 
Only four "integration industries" have been selected: 
caustic soda and chlorinated insecticides in Nicaragua; vehicle 
tires and tubes in Guatemala; and flat and sheet glass in 
Honduras. The latter was never materialized. In fact, the 
Integration Industries Regime lost its attraction when the 
general Treaty was approved in 1960, since the latter established 
the commitment to move on within a short period toward the full 
liberalization of trade and the adoption of a common external 
tariff. 
(b) LAFTA/LAIA 
Thé Treaty of Montevideo included a provision for the co-
ordination of national industrialization policies, although the 
main aim of LAFTA was to form a free trade zone. Complementation 
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agreements were established by industrial sectors, as specific 
programming instruments. 
Most of these Complementation Agreements have been nothing 
else than inter-firm trade specialization by TNCs. Only one of 
them - No. 6, referring to the petrochemical sector, which was 
signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Chile and Peru in 1968 - was about 
new investments and it would serve as a starting point for a 
Sectoral Industrial programme for the Andean Group. 
The LAIA Treaty does not envisage any specific instrument 
for integration of the industrial sector. The Agreements of 
Partial Scope are very alike to the old Complementation 
Agreements and any initiative in the direction of industrial 
programming within LAIA have to be undertaken through this 
instrument. 
(C) CARIFTA/CARICOM 
CARIFTA/CARICOM has a provision for region-wide industrial 
programming through the selection of industries, but this has not 
yet been fully defined and the application of it has been very 
marginal. 
Efforts to programme industrial production on a regional 
basis have been slow and disappointing, the only practical 
achievement to date has been the allocation by the Eastern 
Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) of thirty-one industries, of which 
about seven have come on stream in the subregion; no other 
achievments were registered in the fields of joint promotion of 
industrial development. The feasibility study of a regional 
aluminum complex still awaits final decisions by the Governments 
concerned. At the wider CARICOM level a technical study outlining 
a framework for regional industrial programming in pursuit of the 
objectives of Article 46 of the Common Market Annex to the Treaty 
has only recently been completed. The policy guidelines which 
were used for the study are the satisfaction of basic needs, 
foreign exchange earnings or savings, use of regional raw 
materials, promotion of employment and strengthening of the 
domestic and export sectors of the regional economy. 9 
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Recently, the CARICOM Council of Ministers has established a 
Regional Garment and Textile Advisory Committee of eleven persons 
drawn from the public and private sectors in the Region. The 
Committee will function as an advisory body to the Common Market 
Council. It is charged with examining the needs of the industry, 
in particular in the areas of protection, marketing and technical 
assistance and with making recommendations to the Common Market 
Council on what should be done to meet those needs. 1 0 
(d) Andean Group 
The Andean Group established two main instruments in this 
regard: the Rationalization programme, focusing on existing 
industry (IRP) and the Sectoral Industrial Development programmes 
(SIDP) for programming new investments. 
Not a single IRP has been drawn up in the context of the 
andean integration process, mainly because of the opposition of 
existing enterprises. 
The SIDps may be considered sectoral custom unions since 
they consolidate the expanded market for the products of the 
programmed sector by fixing the common external tariff for it and 
liberalizing reciprocal trade with regard to the particular 
product concerned. They are an attempt to systematically allocate 
industries among member countries to avoid duplication of 
production and unecessary competition. Only selected industries 
are to be included as programs, and each program will cover one 
industry, with products within the industry assigned to member 
countries. Programmes are designed to provide favorable tariff 
preferences and temporary monopolies and semi-monopolies over the 
manufacture of the products. 
It was hoped that through industrial planning the ANCOM 
members would develop new specialized industries and improve 
existing ones, thus reducing the need for imports and increasing 
the amount of exports and employment to the benefit of overall 
regional development. 
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The Board of the Agreement drew up eight proposals for 
SIDPs: in the petrochemical, metal working, automative, iron and 
steel, electronics and telecommunications, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and fertilizer sectors. The country members 
considered feasible only the first four. However, only the three 
first have been approved and the automative has become obsolete 
as TNCs are going through an intense re-shaping of the industry 
oh a regional and world basis. 
The petrochemical and the metal working programs have 
experienced several technical and economic problems that have 
complicated their functioning to such an extent that changes in 
them are currently being negotiated. The first one has suffered 
from oil price fluctuations; the second one is the only one which 
has resulted in exchanges of certain relevance, especially from a 
qualitative point of view. 
The participation of the private sector in the planning 
process of the metal working programs was minimal. Indeed, some 
of the difficulties later encountered in finding domestic 
entrepreneurs willing to undertake feasibility studies and invest 
in the manufacture of products assigned under the program can be 
traced to the lack of involvement of the private sector in the 
evolution and implementation of the program. Ultimately it would 
fall to the technical experts of the Soared to draft the outlines 
of what would become the metal working program. 1 1 
Product assignation had several problems. On the one hand, 
high technology products were assigned to countries with the 
lowest technological capabilities in metal working, in order to 
give them a "big push". So Bolivia and Ecuador were forced to 
turn to TNCs not only for technology but also as partners. On the 
other hand, an independent evaluation of the assignations rated 
quite badly those made to Bolivia and Ecuador, while around half 
of the assignation made to Colombia, Chile and Peru were rated as 
positive.12 
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Regarding the petrochemical agreement, TNCs pressures 
exacerbated interstate conflicts by enhancing the nationalistic 
bargaining behaviour of Andean negotiators eager to create 
national petrochemical industries based on domestic natural gas 
or petroleum resources. The result of this coincidence of 
interests and technology vas a compromise in the rationality of 
industrial planning efforts in the petrochemical sector. The 
creation of six wholly integrated petrochemical complexes built 
in production inefficiencies right from the outset of the 
programme. 
The Andean countries have also designed other instruments 
for joint industrial development. They are the Intersectoral 
Industrial Development programmes and the Integral Development 
Projects, which have not resulted in tangible results yet. The 
Board of the Agreement put forward a proposal for organizing 
programs of this kind» for the electronics and telecommunications, 
chemicals and pharmaceutical sectors, but they were not accepted 
by the countries. 
(e) Cauce 
The Cauce Treaty between Argentina and Uruguay was signed in 
1974. Its main objective is bilateral trade, but it could have 
some direct consequences for the industrial sector. In fact, one 
of its goals is to coordinate industrial activities and other, to 
promote binational enterprises. 
In practice, Cauce has been utilized for industrial 
complementation only by TNCs within the car industry (Fiat and 
Renault).13 
The modifying protocol of the Treaty of Cartagena, signed by 
the Andean countries in May 1987 calls for flexible industrial 
programming so that national programs can be complementary and 
also for agricultural and agro-industrial cooperative programs. 
The Transition Program calls for products to be reserved for 
industrial programming, but no further detail,is available. 
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2. Promotion of Regional Multinational Enterprises 
(a) Andean Group -^ 
The countries1 interest in encouraging the establishment of 
some type of multinational enterprise can be traced back to 
August 1966 when Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru 
signed the Declaration of Bogota. This document calls for the 
adoption of projects in which enterprises and capital of several 
Latin American countries can participate in order to facilitate 
the process of integration. Later, when the Cartagena Agreement 
was signed, it contained a provision to approve a uniform regime 
for multinational enterprises (Article 28); to recommend the 
establishment of multinational enterprises for the 
implementation, expansion or complementation of certain 
industries in the area of industrial programming (Article 38); 
and to establish multinational enterprises which facilitate the 
development of infrastructure projects in the fields of energy, 
transportation and communications (Article 86). The first rules 
of the Andean Group on this subject were contained in Decision 46 
(1971) (see the text in the Annex). However, Decision 46 was 
unable to stimulate the creation of multinationals: it contained 
complex and time-consuming rules for the formation and operation 
of these firms and imposed restrictions on their areas of 
activity, so in 1982, Decision 169 was approved in an attempt to 
eliminate some rigidities of Decision 46; the firms are now 
called Andean Multinational Enterprises. (AME). 
The main characteristics of an AME are set forth in Articles 
1 and 2 of Decision 169 and include the following: 
(1) AME'S must receive contributions from national investors 
of two or more member countries and they must total 
more than 80 per cent of the capital of the enterprise. 
(2) Contributions from foreign investors must be less than 
20 per cent of the capital of the enterprise. 
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(3) When the enterprise is capitalized with contributions 
from only two member countries, the sum of the 
contributions from the investors of each member country 
may not be less than 15 per cent of the capital of the 
enterprise. If there are investors from more than two 
member countries, the contributions from at least two 
countries shall meet the above-mentioned requirements. 
In both cases, investors from the country where the 
principal place of business is located shall contribute 
15 per cent or more of the capital of the enterprise. 
(4) The principal place of business shall be located in one 
of the member countries. 
(5) The majority of subregional capital shall be reflected 
in the technical, administrative, financial and 
commercial operation of the enterprise. 
(6) AME's located in Bolivia and Ecuador may consist of 
subregional capital contributions amounting to 60 per 
cent and foreign capital contributions amounting to 40 
per cent for a period of ten years from the 
establishments of the enterprise, or fifteen years from 
the time Decision 169 becomes effective. 
All AME's may enjoy the following benefits: 
(1) The products of an AME shall enjoy all the benefits of 
the trade liberalization programme. 
(2) The enterprise shall receive the same tax treatment as 
an equivalent to national enterprise. 
(3) The AME shall have access to domestic credit and the 
same financial treatment as a national enterprise. 
(4) The enterprise shall not be required to obtain prior 
authorization from the appropriate national agency to 
invest or reinvest in the same country as the principal 
office. Also in such cases, the net profits of the 
AME's shall be transferable in freely convertible 
currency. 
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(5) AME's may establish branch offices in member countries 
other than the one where the principal office is 
located. 
(6) With the authorization of the appropriate national 
agency, the AME, or its branch, may participate in 
sectors reserved for national enterprises. 
(7) The branches, with the authorization of the appropriate 
national agency, may transfer all net profits in freely 
convertible currency to the principal office. 
(8) Foreign and subregional investors in an AME may transfer 
abroad, with the authorization of the appropriate 
national agency, all net profits in freely convertible 
currency. 
(9) To avoid double taxation, shareholders of an AME will 
not be required to pay taxes on the profits received 
from the branch office which are redistributed to them 
as dividends by the main office, not will investment 
companies which are shareholders in AME1s be required 
to pay taxes on the income they derive from the 
redistribution of the AME's profits. 
(10) Member countries shall treat subregional employees of 
an AME as national employees for purposes of the 
application of foreign labour quotas. 
(11) Member countries shall facilitate the entry into their 
territories of promoters, investors, and executives 
of such enterprises. 
(12) Member countries shall facilitate the contracting of 
technology, patents and trademakers within the region 
where the AME's operate. 
(b) SELA H 
The Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA) is a vast 
programme of regional cooperation adopted in 1975 by most Latin 
American countries. The Panama Agreement for the constitution of 
SELA includes, as one of the objectives of the system, "to 
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improve the allocation of human, natural, technical and financial 
resources of the region, through the formation and stimulation of 
Latin american Multinational Enterprises Such enterprises 
can be created with contributions of State, para-state, private 
or mixed capital, whose national character is to be granted by 
the Member States, and whose activities are to be subject to 
their jurisdiction and control". The mechanisms for the promotion 
of LMA are based on the SELA "Action Committees" created for a 
variety of sectors. The origin of MULTIFERT S.A. is the work of 
the "Action Committee" on fertilizers created by SELA with the 
purpose of exploring and promoting the creation of a 
commercialization mechanism jointly owned by the Latin American 
Countries to deal with the regional demand and supply of 
fertilizers and their raw materials, with the objectives of 
rationalizing the trade among the countries and carry out joint 
imports from third countries on the basis of an increased 
bargaining power. MULTIFERT was created in 1978 by a treaty among 
the governments of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. Its headquarters are in 
Panama and the authorized capital amounts to US$3.75 million. So 
far, it is the only LMA. 
The basic rationale for the creation of MULTIFERT derived 
from the critical importance of the agricultural sector in the 
Latin American economies, and the need to improve its 
productivity through the increased use of fertilizers. In 1974, 
Latin American production represented only 46.9 per cent of total 
consumption. Such external dependence created balance of payments 
problems and serious vulnerability* in a market characterized by 
strong price oscillations frequentlycaused by dumping practices 
on the part of the industrialized countries. 
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3. Measures for Capital Goods Foreign Trade 
(a) Latineguip 
Latineguip is an incorporated company whose shareholders are 
public sector financial institutions - the Bank of the Province 
of Buenos Aires, the Bank of the State of Sao Peuto and the 
National Financiera of Mexico. Its aim is to provide assistance 
to the exporters of capital goods in the commercialization, 
financing and technology transfer operations as well as in the 
establishment of joint ventures. For services supplied to 
interested companies Latineguip charges a fee to be agreed upon 
in accordance with the specific characteristics of each 
operation. 
Latin American exports of capital goods reached 2 per cent 
of the world total in 1982 while regional imports accounted for 7 
per cent of the same total. Intra-regional trade of capital 
goods, on the other hand, represented something less than 5 per 
cent of the total market during the same year. Capital goods 
exports represented 12.5 per cent, 14 per cent and 12.9 per cent 
of the production of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico during 1982-
1983. In the same year, 56 per cent of Argentina, 49 per cent of 
Brazilian and 8 per cent of Mexican exports of capital goods were 
shipped to other developing countries. 
The services offered by Latineguip officially include the 
following: 
(i) Periodical services of regional export supply; 
(ii) Search and development of markets through a set of 
commercial offices and/or representatives; 
(iii) Survey of made to order capital goods demand. This 
includes projects financed by multilateral credit 
institutions; development plants and investment 
programmes of large government enterprises. 
(iv) Constitution of consortia among suppliers; 
(v) Aid to obtain financing at private and public levels; 
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(vi) Transfer of technology and development of joint 
ventures; 
(vii) Negotiation with relevant authorities 
Latinequip entered its operative stage by the end of 
1984 and since then only 10 operations for a total 
value of US$20 million have been fully concluded and 
signed. Its project portfolio, however, reaches almost 
600 operations, of which only an undetermined 
proportion will be carried out. 
One major weakness of Latinequip is that it does not operate 
with the "last fund" modality which is often required in order to 
develop a commercial operation. Potential buyer often do not know 
what they need and somebody has to finance preliminary studies 
even at the risk of losing the money if the deal is finally not 
closed. In order to be competitive with industrialized countries" 
traders this requisite has to be met. 
(b) The Agreement between Argentina and Brazil 
The recent Integration and Cooperation Act signed by 
Argentina and Brazil established a programme for bilateral 
economic integration which should be characterized by its gradual 
character, a growing degree of policy harmonization, 
intersectoral specialization, progressive equilibrium of 
reciprocal trade and the active participation of private 
entrepreneurs in both countries. 
The programme consists of twelve Protocols and their 
subjects are the following: 16 
1. Creation of a customs union in bilateral trade in 
capital goods with removal-of all trade barriers and 
promotion of balanced trade. 
2. Planned growth in Brazilian wheat purchases from 
Argentina 
3. Promotion of food security in both countries through 
increased trade in food products to eliminate seasonal 
shortages. 
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4. Promotion of overall trade levels between the two 
countries, with emphasis on eliminating trade 
imbalances. 
5. Promotion of joint ventures between industrialists of 
both countries. 
6. Financial support from central banks to support 
adjustment to trade imbalances. 
7. Investment fund to be created to expand production. 
8. Co-operation in energy development to expand oil and 
gas production in Argentina and joint electricity 
generation. 
9. Promotion of biotechnology. 
10. Creation of economic research centres to monitor the 
integration project. 
11. Co-operatioñ in the event of nuclear accidents. 
12. Co-operation in aerospace to develop joint export 
potential. 
Most of the Protocols could have an impact on industrial 
development and co-operation between the two countries. However, 
all of them need to be. defined in a more systematic way. So far 
only one of them has been implemented, No. 1 on capital goods, 
although protocol No. 7 is also involved. 
Agreement could not be reached on other sectors which were 
also considered; petrochemical, chemical, plastic and electronics 
industries, as well as the automative industry. With regard to 
this latter caae, the merger of Ford and Volkswagen in the two 
countries has forced other firms in that sector to ask for 
protection and a schism has developed between the manufacturers 
and part suppliers. No agreement was reached concerning maritime 
transport either as the respective flag carriers were unable to 
develop a formula for dividing shipping. 1 7 
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••.Protocol No. 1 on Capital Goods 
For the tine being the Protocol is a custom union. Both 
countries agreed to erase tariff and iion̂ tariff restrictions to 
those goods included in the First Common List (see the Annex for 
a complete list of the capital goods included). The objective is 
to reach a bilateral trade of US$2,000 million between 1987 and 
1990, starting with US$300 million during 1987 (the figure for 
1985 was about US$200 million). They will also have a common 
external tariff regarding these goods. The national treatment can 
only be granted to products with less than 20 per cent of 
imported inputs. 
Each semester the list would be increased with new items up 
to 50 per cent of the universe of agreed capital goods. 
The expansion of the universal exchange must be both 
equilibrated and symmetrical. In practical terms that means that 
if the Brazilian annual superavit is greater than 20 per cent of 
the agreed value, some corrective measures are to be put into 
effect. According to the Protocol No. 7, in that case both 
countries will increase the Investment Fund for the same amount 
of this superavit and this new funds will be invested in 
Argentina, in order to improve its productive and exporting 
capabilities. If the superavit surpasses 40 per cent of that 
value, according to the article 10 of Protocol No. 1, "necessary 
measures will be adopted, which must be compatible vith the 
general trade situation, in order to correct such 
disequilibrium". 
The Ministers of Finance and Economy of both countries must 
co-ordinate their politics on foreign exchange rate in order to 
achieve a stable exchange rate between both countries. Exchange 
rate policy should be neutral with regard to the relative 
competitiveness of exports and imports. 
There are significant differences between incentives, 
benefits, imports price and protection vis-a-vis third countries 
in Argentina and Brazil. Both governments would compensate for 
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their "asymmetries". The idea is to isolate the purely 
competitive aspects of the final price. This "pampered" trade is 
a new concept in the region. Another characteristic of the 
Agreement which is also something new is that the private sector 
played a very active role?in Argentina, although the Brazilian 
list was made by bureaucrats. The Argentinian list was completely 
put together by private firms and in fact it has some ad-hoc 
flair in it. 
The main issues involved for the Argentinian firms were the 
following ones: 
(i) Wage differentiation. Studies specially made confirmed 
that qualified labor is more expensive in Brazil, while 
the opposite is true about unqualified labor. On the 
other hand, wages represent a small fraction of total 
costs; 
(ii) Financial costs of production. This has not been 
discussed with Brazil. In the meanwhile, they are 
higher in Argentina and the government is looking for 
some way to correct it; 
(iii) Export promotion schemes. Here the Brazilians have a 
problem because the Argentinian scheme is more 
favourable than CACEX2s; and 
(iv) Financing of the trade operation. Here some changes 
are needed in both countries in order to put them in 
line with each other. 
It has been suggested that this Agreement could open a new 
stage of the Latin American integration process which would be 
characterized by a slower, more gradualistic approach and by its 
emphasis on bilateral links, in fact, ALADI led the way already 
in 1980. What seems really new in the Agreement is the active 
participation of the private national firms; the emphasis which 
has been put on the capital good sector and the active 
participation of Brazil. In the past it has been said that the 
process of economic integration needed a strong locomotive: maybe 
Brazil will provide that driving force. 
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Awkwardly, worries about the future of the industrial 
aspects of the Protocols are concentrated in the evolution of the 
Brazilian economy and not on the expectations of the private 
Argentinian sector. 
So far Uruguay has only approved a special agreement with 
Brazil, which is basically a wheat-and-meat for industrial 
products exchange. The same country had already signed CAUCE with 
Argentina in 1974. 
One interesting point came out in Argentina with regard to 
the financing of the compensation for the steel price to be paid 
to local manufacturers of final products. In the end the 
Argentinian Chamber of Capital Goods Producers will pay one third 
of the total and the public sector will pay the rest. 
All promotional regimes should not keep going on forever. 
It remains to be seen how fast could they be withdrawn. 
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4. Foreign Investment Policies 
a) The Andean Pact 
Since the inception of the Common Regime on Foreign Investment 
and Technology Transfer - Decision 24- back in December 1970, it 
has suffered successive changes which tended to liberalize it. In 
fact, Decision 220 of May 1987 allows each country to establish 
its own reputations for foreign investors. The Common Regime as 
such does not exist anymore. The analysis of this experience is, 
however, very useful.18 
i) Decision 24 (1970-1987) 
The Competent National Agencies are responsible for 
registering and monitoring direct foreign investment and 
approving contracts on transfer of technology and on patents, as 
well as for signing and monitoring agreements on the conversion 
of foreign enterprises as provided in the Common Regime for 
Foreign Capital and Technology. 
One important point which has not been settled in the AP is 
whether policies of foreign investment should be administered by 
one single agency which would have thus a multidimentional 
approach - or by many different agencies. Both alternatives have 
problems; the first one, because it would require a high degree 
of specialization and it should be very powerful in order to be 
efficient. The second one, on the other hand, could reduce the 
policy of foreign investment to a discrete series of bureaucratic 
registrations and make the achievement of more general goals 
impossible. 
There are no criteria for restricting the flow of direct 
foreign investment, other than those established by Decision 24 
itself and its related provisions and amendments. The general 
atmosphere is one of openness to foreign capital and there is 
clearly a willingness to be flexible or, in some cases, to 
refrain from applying the rules set forth in the Common Regime. 
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The member countries have not established a clear set of 
priorities for authorizing foreign investment. The social and 
economic impact of a project or of a foreign enterprise is used 
as a point of reference or for purposes of information, but not 
as a standard for rejecting direct foreign investment. In this 
regard, there are no specific standards for restricting the 
setting up of foreign enterprises whose international operations 
show deficits, despite the fact that the goal of the Andean Pact 
is to substitute imports and promote exports. 
Most of the member countries have exempted enterprises 
engaged in the exploitation of basic commodities, insurance, 
banking, financing, transport, tourism and mass communications 
media from the scope of the Common Regime. The exceptions allowed 
for the article 44 of Decision 24 have been made.the general 
rule. In practice, the Regime is mainly and almost only applied 
to the manufacturing industry. 
There is no discrimination as regards incentives to 
investment according to the source of the capital concerned. In 
all the member countries, foreign investors receive the same 
treatment as nationals, and when it comes to taxation and/or 
exchange arrangements, differences are not taken into account. 
National agencies have not followed common criteria for the 
authorization of reinvestment by foreign enterprises. 
There is no uniform standard with respect to the positive 
application of agreements providing for the conversion of foreign 
enterprises; in practice, the mechanism is hardly ever used. This 
was considered a fundamental rule of Decision 24 but different 
developments - not only opposition from the TNCs - have made it 
almost completely obsolete for new investments. 
There are no major differences among member countries as 
regards the criteria they apply for registration of direct 
foreign investment. All the countries allow the registration of 
capital investments in foreign or national currency, 
capitalization of loans, valuation of tangible goods, 
reinvestments and capitalization of resources in general. Except 
30 
in one country the competent national agencies have issued 
explicit regulations concerning procedures for registration of 
direct foreign investment. These lists in detail the 
documentation which is reguired for this purpose. In general 
terms, all the procedures are very similar. 
The member countries have not regularly applied 
restrictions on the granting of medium - and long-term internal 
credit to foreign enterprises, and there is a tendency to 
eliminate the restrictions established in the Common Regime on 
this subject. On the other hand, all countries have specific 
criteria and mechanisms for regulating the arrangement by foreign 
corporations of external loans from financing agencies or parent 
companies and/or subsidiaries. However, the compliance of these 
regulations leave not been evaluated. 
Although, historically, transfers of profits of foreign 
corporations they have not reached the ceiling of 20 per cent 
above the amount of investment registered with the competent 
national agencies, there is a general tendency among the member 
countries to have the regulation of this aspect up to national 
legislation. 
The member countries have not been fully enforcing the 
criteria established in Decision 24 with regard to authorization 
and monitoring of the right to re-export capital. 
There are no specific agreements with foreign enterprises in 
connexion with the purposes, objectives or programmes of global 
and/or sectoral policies, although some member countries have 
legal mechanisms for implementing such policies. There are no 
common mechanisms for regulating new types of contracts with 
foreign enterprises ("turn-key" contracts, for example). Some 
member countries have sighed documents which violate the 
provisions of the Common Regime with respect to the application 
of criteria of extraterritoriality in the settlement of possible 
conflicts or disputes with foreign corporations. 
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There are no specific criteria for monitoring the majority 
participation of national investors in national or mixed 
enterprises and ensuring that this participation is reflected in 
the management of production, administration, marketing and 
finances of these firms. 
Changes in Decision 24 made by the Commission of the 
Cartagena Agreement 
From its inception Decision 24 has undergone several changes as a 
result of decisions taken by the Commissions of the Cartagena 
Agreement. The most significant changes were made in 1976, as the 
five other signatories tried to prevent Chile from withdrawing 
from the Andean Group. By Decision 97, the Government of Chile 
was authorized to sell stock in State enterprises belonging to 
CORFO to foreign investors. The most important modifications were 
made by means of Decisions 103, 109 and 110, as follows: 
- Creation of special categories of capital: subregional 
capital is to be considered as national capital when certain 
specific requirements are met, and neutral capital, in the case 
of international public financing agencies or governmental 
agencies concerned with cooperation for economic development. 
This category of capital is not to be taken into account in 
determining the nature of the firm. 
- Conversion agreements: the date on which the conversion 
of foreign firms was to begin was postponed from 30 June 1971 to 
1 January 1974. Authorization was also given for the 
incorporation of new direct foreign investment to national or 
mixed enterprises provided the enterprise remained at least a 
mixed one. 
- Remittance of profits: the ceiling for transfer was raised 
from 14 per cent to 20 per cent of registered direct foreign 
investment. Undistributed gains may be invested as direct foreign 
investment. 
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- Reinvestment of capital: the rate of reinvestment 
permitted was increased from 5 per cent to 7 per cent. 
- Access to domestic credit: foreign enterprises were 
allowed access to long and medium-term credit on the local 
financial market, the provision concerning the regulation of 
short-term credit by each country was eliminated. 
Çfalfflit in PeQiUjon 24 a4aptffl| unilaterally fry tt>+ countries, 
There are significant differences in the way member countries of 
the Andean Group conceive and apply Decision 24. Several of these 
differences actually entailed ad hoc amendments to Decision 24. 
Conversion agreements are being applied less and less and 
some countries have stopped signing them and enforcing them. The 
countries have been more and more willing to accept the idea -
even though it is contrary of Decision 24 - that these contracts 
are to be applied solely to those firms which wish to benefit 
from the expanded Andean market. 
As regards national jurisdiction over disputes relating to 
direct foreign investment, two countries have signed agreements 
with OPIC which, in practice, go beyond this principle 
established in Article 51 of Decision 24. 
The ceiling on the remittance of profits established by 
Article 37 have been overlooked in several countries, either as a 
general rule or in specific cases. 
The principle of not authorizing direct foreign investment 
in activities for which the demand is already sufficiently 
covered (Article 3) lias not been generally applied. 
As regards the existence of sectors to which the access of 
direct foreign investment is restricted (Articles 40-44), there 
have been significant exceptions. 
The least controversial areas are the registration of direct 
foreign investment and the transfer of technology, although there 
are significant differences in the way the relevant rules are 
applied from one country to another. 
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Tggftnçlogy 
Decision 24 stipulates that all contracts on the importation of 
technology and on patents and brands - whether or not they 
involve payment - must be examined and submitted to the 
competent national authority for approval. This agency is 
responsible for evaluating the real contribution of the imported 
technology by estimating its potential profitability and, the 
price of goods which incorporate it or establishing some other 
specific quantification of the impact of the imported technology. 
Decision 84 adds some criteria for evaluating applications 
for the importation of technology, including the following: 
- its impact on local technological development; 
- its impact on technology in employment; 
- its contribution to national or subregional development 
plan; 
- its impact on the balance of payments and on the 
generation of income; 
- its impact on thé environment. 
Under Decision 24, clauses providing the following 
information must be included: 
- identification of modalities of transfer of technology; 
- contractual value of each element involved; 
- determination of the period during which it shall be 
in force. 
In addition the authorisation of certain types of clauses, 
is forbidden including those which would entail on obligation to 
purchase capital goods, intermediate products, raw materials or 
other technologies from a given source; those which would reserve 
for sellers the right to fix prices; those which would restrict 
the volume or structure of production; those which would prohibit 
the use of competing technologies; those which would establish 
option to buy - total or partial - in favour of the supplier or 
the technology, which would require the buyer of technology to 
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transfer to the supplier any investion or improvement resulting 
from the use of such technology; those which would make it 
obligatory to pay royalties for unused patents; and those which 
would prohibit or limit the export of products made with the 
technology concerned, except in exceptional cases, excluding 
those falling within the sphere of subregional trade or the 
export of similar products to third countries. 
A transfer of technology may not be considered a capital 
contribution and, in an intra-firm transaction, it does not give 
rise to a right to receive royalties or tax deductions. 
Decision 24 provides that contracts for the licensing of 
brands may not include any restrictive clauses which would for 
example, prohibit or limit the right to export or sale in certain 
countries of products made with the brand name; require the use 
of raw materials, intermediate goods and equipment supplied by 
the owner of the brand or its affiliates; fix sale or resale 
prices; require the payment of royalties for unused brands, or 
require the use, on a permanent basis, of personnel supplied by, 
or designated by, the owner of the brand. 
Not all contracts on the importation of technology are 
registered. In several countries, public sector contracts are 
either not registered or only partially registered, despite the 
large number of contracts involved. The acquisition of technology 
incorporated into capital goods is not systematically registered, 
evaluated or controlled in any country of the Andean Group. This 
type of transfer of technology undoubtedly accounts for the bulk 
of payments for technology made by these countries. 
In general, it may be said that clauses which are expressly 
prohibited by Decision 24 have been eliminated from contracts, 
although there are some exceptions. As regards intra-firm 
payments, there are no uniform criteria in the subregion for 
establishing the existence of a dependency relationship between a 
parent company and a subsidiary. The criteria used generally 
refer to the holding by the parent company of stock in the 
subsidiary, and this varies from country to country. 
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There are very few cases in which technology contracts have 
been rejected. Several countries provide for a domestic recourse 
vis-a-vis the authority which is responsible for registering 
contracts. 
Countries which do register contracts systematically tend 
to focus their attention on formal aspects, while they only 
consider the actual purpose of the contract in vague general 
terms. Up to now, the emphasis of policies on technology has been 
more quantitative than qualitative in all the countries which do 
apply registration. Contracts are normally analyzed in terms of 
their cost in foreign exchange, while their actual technological 
content, in connexion with which Decision 24 and 84 establish 
clear and explicit evaluation guidelines is not analyzed in 
detail, often because the necessary technical means are not 
available. 
The modalities and magnitudes of payments made abroad for 
technology contracts vary considerably from country to country. 
The practice of basing payments on a percentage of net sales, 
accounts for more than half of all cases in one country and 
almost two-thirds in other; in a third, it only represents 12 per 
cent, k second option is that of paying a fixed amount; this has 
been adopted to varying degrees in the different countries and 
accounts for one-third of all cases in one country, 19 per cent 
in other and only 4 per cent in a third. In 1981 these payments 
ranged from a very low percentage of the countries * exports to 
0.6 per cent. This difference may be explained by the different 
degrees to which the process is centralized in the various 
countries. 
Intra-firm payments for technology imports were not 
interrupted with Decision 24, although they are prohibited. The 
publications of the United States Department of Commerce attest 
to this. 
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There are no subregional criteria concerning the range of 
payments allowed in connexion with the various economic sectors. 
In the case of one country, for example, it amounts to between 2 
per cent and 3 per cent for the engineering and metal products 
sector and 2 per cent for the pharmaceutical sector, whereas 
payments usually are not authorized for the food sector. 
In some cases, larger payments are authorized as a means of 
promoting exports. There is no technological justification for 
this criterion. 
There is no evidence of regular and systematic monitoring, 
in any of the countries, of the performance of obligations. This 
is particularly true in the case of the actual transfer of the 
technology concerned. This does not mean that some countries do 
not closely follow the development of a given number of contracts 
each year, as in Colombia, for example. In general, no fines have 
been imposed for non-compliance with contracts. 
Extensions of contracts show a certain tendency to reduce 
their duration, although there are a large number of long-term 
contracts. 
None of the Andean Group countries have conducted long-term 
evaluations of the effectiveness of the andean regime for the 
transfer of technology. 
Decision 220 (May 1987) 
In Nay 1967 the Andean Pact nations agreed on important changes 
in the Treaty of Cartagena and they modified Decision 24. The new 
Decision 220 in fact consolidates some changes already in force 
in different countries.19 Each country now has broader latitude 
to regulate foreign investment in accordance with its own 
regulations. The most significant changes are the following: 
- transformation from foreign to mixed or national ownership 
is no longer required, except for investors wishing to benefit 
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from intra-Andean tariff and other trade benefits; in these 
cases, the transformation period has been expanded from 15 to 30 
years (37 years in Bolivia and Ecuador); 
- annual earnings remittances will no longer necessarily be 
limited to 20 percent of net registered capital, as individual 
countries may authorize higher percentages at their discretion; 
- reinvestments no longer require prior authorization 
regardless of the amount reinvested; 
- interest rates on loans from abroad to foreign firms are 
no longer subject to a limit of 3 percent over prime or LIBOR 
(the London Inter Bank Offer Rate); interest rates are left to 
individual countries" discretion; 
- expanded access to local credit markets for foreign 
investors; 
- shares in local companies may be sold to foreign 
investors, subject to local approval; 
- prohibitions on investments in certain sectors are still 
in force; each government must determine which sectors will be 
restricted in accordance with Article 3 of Decision 220, which 
provides: "The member countries will not authorize direct foreign 
investment in activities considered properly managed by local 
existing companies"; 
- restrictions on international arbitration of investment 
disputes are left to the discretion of individual countries. 
Decision 220 keeps controls and certain restrictions 
relating to the technology transfer and licensing. However, it 
has eliminated the prohibition on royalty payments between 
branches and their head offices or affiliates. 
b) Caricom 
The Common Market Annex of the Treaty of Chaguaramas includes 
on article calling for a regional policy on foreign investment. 
According to article 44 market states "recognize the need for 
continuing inflows of extra-regional capital and the urgent 
necessity to promote development in the less developed 
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countries'* and declare that they "shall keep under review the 
question of ownership and control of their resources with a view 
to increasing the extent of national participation in their 
economies and working toward the adoption as far as possible of 
common policy on foreign investment". 
A Draft Agreement on foreign investment and the development 
of technology - inspired on Decision 24 of the Andean Group - was 
proposed for adoption at the Special Heads of Governments 
Conference held in St. Lucia in July 1974, but it was not 
accepted. 
c) Central America Common Market. 
The 1960 Treaty does not contain any reference to the 
treatment of FI within the CACM. In 1976, a High Level Committee 
submitted to the different Governments of the area a draft of the 
Central America Economic and Social Community, which included 
specific regulations on foreign investment. However, this new 
treaty has not been approved as of today. 
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5. Investment Financing 
There are four multinational development banks in the region. The 
Inter American Development Bank (XOB), the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF) and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). 
CAF 
The CAF has approved credit operations for US$572 millions 
since 1971, when it Initiated its activities, up to December 
1985. It is by far the most important channel for joint 
subregional investment and its authorized capital has been 
recently increased from US$400 to US$1,000 million. During 1983 
the CAF approved credits for US$121 millions corresponding to 20 
operations. With regard to the project distribution by sectors, 
to industry corresponded something less than a third of the 
total. The rest of it went to energy (30 per cent), agriculture 
(16 per cent), transportation (14 per cent) and mining (10 per 
cent). 
CABEI 
The Constitutive Agreement of CABEI went into effect in 
1961. The CABEI went through a liquidity crisis during the past 
years and also had political problems, as the country members 
would not agree on the person of the President of the Bank. In 
fact, at the end of the 1982-1983 period was not possible to 
finance the meeting of the Board of Governors. In February 1985 
the Ordinary Assembly decided to create a Fund for the Economic 
and Development of Central America, with capital for US$250 
million. 
CDB 
The CDB operations declined in 1985 up to the 1978 level and 
the total approved lending reached only US$41 millions, all of 
them to the public sector and 90 per cent for the development of 
infrastructure. The industrial sector got 18.5 per cent of that 
total. Additionally the CDB lent US$7.8 million for new projects 
in the LDCs of Caricom. 
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IDB 2 0 
In 1983 the IDB decided to create the Inter-American 
Investment Corporation, thus providing the region with a 
complementary mechanism to supply the necessary investment for 
the private sector"s production activities. 
Since 1969 the IDB has undertaken a variety of initiatives 
to implement such a mechanism. At its XXII Annual Meeting, held 
in 1981, the IDB Board of governors considered Venezuela's 
proposal to establish a Multinational Trust Fund for equity 
investments, and the Board Committee was asked to study the plan 
and consult with member countries interested in the initiative. 
Since than the Committee has met several times, because a 
large number of member countries demonstrated their willingness 
to participate in the initiative. The negotiations culminated in 
a meeting of interested parties held in Rome on November 3-4, 
1983, during which the text of the Constitutive Agreement of the 
Inter-American Investment Corporation was signed. All IDB 
borrowing countries signed the document, as did the United States 
and Italy, among the Bank's developed member countries. The other 
member countries had until 29 February, 1984, to sign the 
document if they wished to be included as founding members of the 
Corporation. 
The purpose of the Corporation is to promote the economic 
development of its developing regional member countries by 
stimulating the establishment, expansion, and modernization of 
private enterprise, giving priority to small and medium-scale 
operations, in a manner that will complement the activities of 
the Inter->American Development Bank. Also eligible for financing 
are enterprises whose shareholders include the government or 
other public entities with activities that strengthen the private 
sectors of the economy. 
In order to do this, the Corporation will exercise the 
following role: to help finance the establishment, expansion and 
modernization of enterprises; to stimulate investment 
41 
opportunities; to provide technical cooperation; and to promote 
the development of Latin America*s capital markets. 
In addition, the Corporation will encourage participation by 
other sources of financing and/or technology, recurring to the 
most appropriate modes - among which are consortia for obtaining 
loans and the acquisition of stock by the Corporation in such 
companies, as well as joint enterprise, and other forms of 
association, such as licensing agreements, marketing or 
management contract», and the like. The Corporation will also 
attempt to cofinance local financial institutions and, in 
general, work together with them and other international and 
bilateral investment institutions. 
The goals of the Corporation will be the following: project 
identification; direct investment in viable private enterprise; 
financing and strengthening of development financing entities 
that serve small enterprises; the creation of interest in direct 
investment opportunities in Latin American enterprises; the 
promotion of capital-market expansion; and the provision of 
advisory assistance on ways of encouraging a healthy climate for 
the expansion of private investment. 
The Corporation's principal financial instruments will be 
long-term loans (from five to twelve years) with grace periods, 
equity investments in suitable enterprises, and the concession of 
partial or total guarantees when appropriate. 
The investment activities of the Corporation will 
concentrate chiefly on medium-sized enterprises. The size of 
these firms, measures by such criteria a total asset, net worth, 
number of employees, and so forth, will vary from one country to 
another, and over time. Investment may be made in association 
with local, regional, and international financial institutions 
and may be carried out through consortium operations or other 
catalyzing mechanisms, as deemed appropriate. This focus on 
medium-sized enterprises what distinguishes the Corporation from 
other similar international financial institutions that operate 
in the region. 
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The Corporation also considers the promotion of small-scale 
enterprises in the developing countries as à matter of prime 
importance in terms of social and economic development. However, 
the experience of other international financial institutions and 
the evaluation of other forms of operation applicable to the 
small-scale enterprise indicate that it is not possible to 
provide backing for these businesses directly or individually 
from Corporation headquarters. The activities of the Corporation 
in this respect would primarily consist of financing (debt or 
equity) and/or providing technical cooperation to private or 
semi-private financial intermediaries, funds, or programmes 
designed to promote small-scale enterprises. With this goal in 
mind, the Corporation will also attempt to coordinate its 
activities with respect to small-scale enterprises and cofinance 
these projects with other international, regional or subregiohal 
institutions that can commit themselves to providing assistance 
to such enterprises. 
One of the basic criteria for determining the possibility 
for investment will be a consideration of the economic impact of 
the eligible projects and enterprises. Project sponsors will 
provide a considerable part of the capital for the enterprises 
and, generally speaking, thé Corporation's financing through 
equity capital, quasi-equitycapital, and/or debt instruments 
should complement local resources and beutilized, insofar as 
possible, to mobilize additional funding from other sources. 
The maximum financial committment from the Corporation for a 
given project or enterprise will not exceed 40 per cent of the 
total cost, or this same percentage of the company's total stock. 
The total of these committments may not exceed 10 per cent of the 
net capital of the Corporation in any given case. For equity 
investment, the Corporation's share in the total capital of a 
business may not exceed 33 per cent nor be less than 15 per cent. 
The initial authorized capital of the Corporation will be 
US$200 million, distributed in 20,000 shares of US$10,000 each, 
underwritten by the IDB member countries that have agreed to join 
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the institution. This capital may be increased by the 
Corporation's Board of Governors. Once the authorized capital has 
been totally paid in, the Board may also authorize the issue of 
callable capital. The Latin American countries, as a group, have 
stated their intention to underwrite 45 per cent of the capital. 
The other 45 per cent would be supplied by the United States, 
Italy, and other developed member nations of the IDB. 
Other funding for this entity will be derived from bond 
issues, debt papers and stock certificates; dividend income, 
commissions, interest and other funds derived from the 
Corporation's investments; loan recovery; sales of business 
investments; and any other contributions and funds entrusted to 
its administrations. 
The Corporation will be a separate and distinct entity from 
the IDB. Therefore, its resources and operations will remain 
autonomous and its basic organization will be independent. 
However, it is hoped that the Corporation will reach agreement 
with the IDB regarding the use of certain Bank facilities. 
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6. TeçhnQlpgJgal çpQperatJPn ** 
The Cartagena Agreement covers technological policy for the 
subregion and provides for the establishment of the Andean system 
of Technological Information (SAIT) and the andean programmes of 
Technological Development (PADT). SAIT functions as a clearing 
house in the subregion for the exchange of technological 
information whereas PADT aims at promoting assimilation and 
development of technology relevant to or appropriate for the 
subregion. 
PADT has since developed a few significant technological 
programmes for the subregion. First, the Andean Project for 
Technological Development in Copper Hydrometallurgy was approved. 
This was designed to step up the transfer and adaptation of 
technologies for copper extraction by acid solution and by 
bacterian-acid process, and recuperation through ion exchange and 
electrode position, the project was also involved in the training 
of qualified personnel as well as in adapting and integrating the 
advances equipment and technology from the transnational 
corporations for regional applications. The main beneficiaries of 
this project are the copper-producing members, Bolivia and Peru. 
Secondly, the Andean Forest Project was set up with a view 
to conducting research and disseminating knowledge in regard to 
the timber and other forest resources in the subregion. Work on 
testing various forest species has been carried out and new 
technology for timber exploitation has been developed. 
Specifically the Andean Laboratory of Wood Engineering was 
founded in Lima and the Andean system of Classification of 
Structural Wood was developed. 
Thirdly, the Andean Project of Food Technology was approved 
by Decision 126 of the Agreement. The project has five programmes 
designed to carry out research on the production, marketing and 
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consumption of food In the subreglon with a view to developing 
food of high nutritional value and low cost for groups such as 
children and pregnant women. 
Finally, a programme for promoting social and economic 
development of the rural environment has been set by PADT. The 
programme with the generation and transfer of technology related 
to the development of a sound rural environment. 
Apart from activities within the two formal organizations, 
SAIT and PADT, regional technological cooperation as provided by 
the Cartagena Agreement also includes appropriate legislations 
for marketing technology, patent rights and the legal aspects of 
technology transfer from outside the subreglon. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNIDO AND ECLAC PROGRAMMES 
1. The need for research on the subject 
A thorough examination of the process of internationalization of 
production in Latin America has never been attempted, mainly 
because of the traditional split of the subject between TNCs, on 
the one hand, and economic integration, on the other. The first -
TNCs within the industrial sector - has not been systematically 
researched for the region 2 2 and the latter is usually visualized 
as a derivative from foreign trade. Completely lost in the 
analysis is the private foreign direct investment made by local 
firms. 
There is no doubt that UNIDO and ECLAC are the logic 
agencies to do the necessary research on this important subject. 
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2. A tentative outline of the study 
The research should include the following aspects: 
I. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION 
1. The concept of the internationalization of 
production 
2. Economic integration efforts aiming at some form of 
international specialization of the productive 
system; 
3. Foreign direct investment by local investors: 
characteristics, dynamics, preconditions and 
results. The special case of joint ventures; 
4. Foreign direct investment by TNCs within the 
industrial sector in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
II. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS 
1. Similarities and differences among the diverse 
channels for the internationalization of 
production; 
2. Differential success of private and public promotion of this 
process. Some explanations for it; 
3. Convergency of divergence of these channels? What 
governments could do, different options. 
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